Full Scale Conflict Unlikely To Resume Between Ethiopia and Eritrea
Executive Summary: It is likely that Ethiopia and Eritrea will continue to play brinkmanship; however, notwithstanding accidental flashpoint border conflicts, full scale conflict is unlikely. A war by proxy in Somalia, Sudan and other areas of conflict is a more likely response by both countries.
There has been much buzz and disagreement over the likely outcome of Ethiopian-Eritrean tensions. It has been seven years since the two countries expended 70,000 lives to fight over border towns of little economic or strategic value. The crux of the justification of this arm confrontation was that Ethiopia and Eritrea claimed to be protecting their own citizens who did not want to come under the rule of the other. As late as 2005 full scale conflict between the two counties seemed only held at bay by the thin blue line of UN troops (UNMEE); however, recent developments, particular centered around the war against terror, have given the countries further reasons to avoid conflict.
The 2006 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, deposing of the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC), and the installment of the Transitional Federal Government, have raised tensions between the two countries; but has demonstrated significant capabilities and alliances which drastically dissuade further direct conflict. Ethiopia’s actions have gained it the attention of more insurgent/terrorist groups. In addition to the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the Ogden National Liberation Front (ONLF), Al-Ittihad al-Islamiyya (AIAI), and other internal insurgent groups, Ethiopia is now a primary target for the SCIC and a plethora of smaller Islamic terrorist groups in Somalia. Ethiopia has had to maintain a significant presence in Mogadishu in order to secure the TFG as a governing body; this fact gives many smaller groups, such as the Mujahideen Youth Movement, access to Ethiopian targets. Moreover, US aid dependent Ethiopia has installed itself as a solid alley of the US in the war on terror. After wide-spread criticism surrounding the 2005 elections and following violence and abuses of state claimed much of Ethiopia’s foreign aid, it is unlikely that Ethiopia will risk further loss of aid by appearing as the aggressor in a renewed conflict with Eritrea.
Eritrea, frustrated with the international community’s failure to enforce the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) rulings, has continued to alienate western countries, particularly the US. In 2005 Eritrea expelled all North American and European UNMEE forces and banned all UN flights over its territory. “Eritrea has demonstrated its frustration with the US by harassing its embassy staff in Asmara; in return the US has responded by closing an Eritrean consulate in California and threatening to put Eritrea on the list of state sponsors of terrorism” (Janes). Being threatened with inclusion to the list of state sponsors of terrorism is likely to compel Eritrea reconsider the potential use/support of Ethiopian insurgents (OLF, ONLF, etc) as a “second front” to tie up Ethiopian forces at home, and conduct attacks to Ethiopia’s rear areas. Eritrea has historically supported the OLF in part through Somali faction leader Hussein Aideed.With the US threat and the precedence set by US artillery and air support to the Ethiopian 2006 invasion of Somalia, it is highly unlikely that the Eritrea will want to be seen as aggressors in a renewed conflict with Ethiopia fearing US involvement on behalf of Ethiopia.
Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - North Africa indicates there is little reason to expect a near end to dispute: “There appear to be few suggestions that the conflict between the two nations is close to resolution as Ethiopia has continued to reject the commission's announcement that it would demarcate the border on maps and leave it to Ethiopia and Eritrea to address the physical boundary. Eritrea continues to remain closed to renegotiation citing that it was agreed that the ruling would be 'final and binding'.” It is likely that the two countries will continue to play brinksmanship; however, notwithstanding accidental flashpoint border conflicts, full scale conflict is unlikely. A war by proxy in Somalia, Sudan and other areas of conflict is a more likely response by both countries.
Full Scale Conflict Unlikely To Resume Between Ethiopia and Eritrea
Executive Summary: It is likely that Ethiopia and Eritrea will continue to play brinkmanship; however, notwithstanding accidental flashpoint border conflicts, full scale conflict is unlikely. A war by proxy in Somalia, Sudan and other areas of conflict is a more likely response by both countries.
There has been much buzz and disagreement over the likely outcome of Ethiopian-Eritrean tensions. It has been seven years since the two countries expended 70,000 lives to fight over border towns of little economic or strategic value. The crux of the justification of this arm confrontation was that Ethiopia and Eritrea claimed to be protecting their own citizens who did not want to come under the rule of the other. As late as 2005 full scale conflict between the two counties seemed only held at bay by the thin blue line of UN troops (UNMEE); however, recent developments, particular centered around the war against terror, have given the countries further reasons to avoid conflict.
The 2006 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, deposing of the Supreme Council of Islamic Courts (SCIC), and the installment of the Transitional Federal Government, have raised tensions between the two countries; but has demonstrated significant capabilities and alliances which drastically dissuade further direct conflict. Ethiopia’s actions have gained it the attention of more insurgent/terrorist groups. In addition to the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the Ogden National Liberation Front (ONLF), Al-Ittihad al-Islamiyya (AIAI), and other internal insurgent groups, Ethiopia is now a primary target for the SCIC and a plethora of smaller Islamic terrorist groups in Somalia. Ethiopia has had to maintain a significant presence in Mogadishu in order to secure the TFG as a governing body; this fact gives many smaller groups, such as the Mujahideen Youth Movement, access to Ethiopian targets. Moreover, US aid dependent Ethiopia has installed itself as a solid alley of the US in the war on terror. After wide-spread criticism surrounding the 2005 elections and following violence and abuses of state claimed much of Ethiopia’s foreign aid, it is unlikely that Ethiopia will risk further loss of aid by appearing as the aggressor in a renewed conflict with Eritrea.
Eritrea, frustrated with the international community’s failure to enforce the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission (EEBC) rulings, has continued to alienate western countries, particularly the US. In 2005 Eritrea expelled all North American and European UNMEE forces and banned all UN flights over its territory. “Eritrea has demonstrated its frustration with the US by harassing its embassy staff in Asmara; in return the US has responded by closing an Eritrean consulate in California and threatening to put Eritrea on the list of state sponsors of terrorism” (Janes). Being threatened with inclusion to the list of state sponsors of terrorism is likely to compel Eritrea reconsider the potential use/support of Ethiopian insurgents (OLF, ONLF, etc) as a “second front” to tie up Ethiopian forces at home, and conduct attacks to Ethiopia’s rear areas. Eritrea has historically supported the OLF in part through Somali faction leader Hussein Aideed. With the US threat and the precedence set by US artillery and air support to the Ethiopian 2006 invasion of Somalia, it is highly unlikely that the Eritrea will want to be seen as aggressors in a renewed conflict with Ethiopia fearing US involvement on behalf of Ethiopia.
Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment - North Africa indicates there is little reason to expect a near end to dispute: “There appear to be few suggestions that the conflict between the two nations is close to resolution as Ethiopia has continued to reject the commission's announcement that it would demarcate the border on maps and leave it to Ethiopia and Eritrea to address the physical boundary. Eritrea continues to remain closed to renegotiation citing that it was agreed that the ruling would be 'final and binding'.” It is likely that the two countries will continue to play brinksmanship; however, notwithstanding accidental flashpoint border conflicts, full scale conflict is unlikely. A war by proxy in Somalia, Sudan and other areas of conflict is a more likely response by both countries.
Analytic Confidence: 6
Source Reliability: 9